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The paper introduces a connection between the needs of exchanges to respond
to the immediacy needs of their clientele and the need to manage the credit risks
faced by exchange members.  Queueing theory is used to represent the
opportunity loss suffered by brokers engaging in multiple activities: order-flow
origination and its intermediation.  The role of market-making locals is depicted
as enabling specialization.  Brokers focus on originating order flow and locals on
fulfilling intermediation needs.  The capacity to specialize is constrained by the
availability of creditworthy members acting as locals.  This results in a tension
between pursuit of immediacy and managing inter-member credit exposure.  Two
exchange rules, tick size and price limits, are evaluated for their effects in
resolving this tension.
This research benefits from the comments of Ray DeGennaro, Mark Flannery,
Steve Kane, Tom Lindley, Jay Marchand, Pat Parkinson, Asani Sarkar, Lester
Telser, Rich Tsuhara and participants of the Brookings-Wharton Financial
Services Conference (January, 2002).  Errors remaining in this draft are mine.
The views of the paper do not reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve.2
I. Introduction
  Moser (2000) describes the development of modern futures
clearinghouses as the culmination of a series of adaptations to credit risk
problems.  Baer, France and Moser (2001) extend this reasoning to show how
contract margin requirements reflect the interests of exchange members who
jointly minimize their credit risk exposures and their margin-carry costs.
Common to these papers is their application of a theory of efficient contract
design to futures contracts.  A contractual perspective on exchange membership
is also useful.  Viewed this way, exchange rules become terms to contracts of
membership.  In turn, those rules become subject to the same efficiency
concerns as any other contract-design problem.  This thought exercise gives
insight into the economics that underlay exchange organizations.  Just as
members continually re-contract to control price risks arising from their extant
financial positions, they also adjust exchange rules affecting their membership
standings.
This paper models linkages between exchange decisions affecting
contract performance and meeting customer demand for immediacy.  Immediacy
is the time required for filling customer orders and, in this sense, the term
describes the performance of transaction service providers.  The duration of
order-fill processing creates exposure to price changes, an exposure that
increases as order-fill duration lengthens.  This outcome is attributable to both
information arrival and to market liquidity.  More straightforward is information
arrival: Informed traders want their orders filled before prices adjust to their
information.  Less straightforward is the added exposure to the price implications3
of liquidity.  Liquidity is a conditional expectation of the association between the
price response of a transaction and its size.  As large transactions are more likely
to move prices, liquidity descriptions are usually made in terms of the largest
transaction having no expected price impact.  Because long-duration order fills
increase exposure to these price effects, poor liquidity elevates the importance of
immediacy.
Immediacy needs are common to all exchanges.  Securities markets are
organized to facilitate brokered transactions with a combination of human and
computer resources.  Specialists holding limit order books provide a nexus for
price discovery.  Computerized order-handling meets most immediacy needs by
using algorithms to match the buy and sell sides of most at-market orders.
Open-outcry futures markets are organized as continuous auction markets.
Immediacy is provided by locals tracking buy and sell interests on the floor; the
transactions of locals serve to intermediate externally originating order flows.
Given the problems arising from a lack of immediacy, exchange members
have interests in taking steps that reduce the problem.  Increasing the number of
members improves the number of opportunities to find a counter party within a
time span.  Selecting from a homogenous population of potential members, the
choice is straightforward: add members until the immediacy problem goes away.
However, potential members are more likely to be heterogeneous, particularly so
in their credit dimensions.  Scarcity of strong credits among a population of
potential members constrains immediacy improvements.  This paper uses a
queueing theory representation to quantify costs implied by inadequate4
immediacy and develops a trade off between these costs and the costs incurred
when weak credits are accepted as members.
To see its relevance, consider how membership size affects an exchange
member’s interests.  We readily see the benefit when our grocer opens another
checkout line and decreases the portion of a Saturday spent standing in line.
Likewise, adding an exchange member can decrease time spent locating
contract counterparties.  This is to say that increasing the number of members
improves transaction immediacy at a given price.  From this, it follows that the
cost for obtaining immediacy declines as membership size increases.  From the
perspective of individual members, every other member is a potential service
channel and—like grocery check out lanes—more service channels are preferred
to less.
On the other hand, adding members has risk management consequences.
Baer, France and Moser (2001) show that monitoring members for their
nonperformance prospects can substitute for collateralizing against losses.
However, they find no evidence of differential collateral assessments as would be
indicative of substantive reliance on monitoring.  Collateral appears to be the
primary risk-management tool and collateral requirements are the same for most
members.  This being the case, an increase in the riskiness of new members
increases the collateral required from all members.
The literature on financial intermediation has not previously drawn from
queueing theory to address financial structural issues.  Indeed, use of the theory
is infrequent in the general economic literature.  Naor (1969) includes queue-5
residence time as a component of all-in product cost.  De Vany (1976) introduces
queueing theory to the industrial organization literature by incorporating wait time
into monopoly pricing problems.  In their analysis of the trucking industry, De
Vany and Saving (1977) extend wait time costs to pricing in competitive markets.
The empirical study of Frech and Lee (1987) gauges the inefficient allocation of
gasoline caused by use of wait time as a non-price rationing mechanism.
Davidson (1988) shows how firms can use wait time preferences to segment
service markets.
The next section illustrates concepts of the paper with a numerical
illustration for an exchange comprised entirely of principals.  Section III models
an exchange whose order flow originates externally.  Specialization arises as
brokers work with external parties to develop order flow.  Immediacy providers
absorb order flow based on their abilities to track buy and sell interests among
the brokers.  Section IV relates exchange rules to efforts to improve the terms of
the trade off between immediacy demands and exposure to risk.  Price tick rules
affect the share of revenue obtained by locals, adjusting these rules can affect
local participation in a contract.  Price limit rules limit the level of liquid resources
required of locals.  Section V develops some perspective on the policy
implications of the model and summarizes the paper.
II. Exchange Membership Comprised of Principals
A simulation exercise provides an intuitive basis for this queueing
representation.  A population of potential exchange members is constructed and6
ordered by the expected losses incurred by surviving members when any single
member fails.  For this exercise, members trade for their own account only, that
is, they trade as principals.  Assuming the clearing organization requires full
protection from expected losses, the required collateral level is the amount of
loss exposure implied by the weakest credit permitted to join.  Calibrating loss
amounts to an S&P transition matrix of bond ratings adds some realism to the
exercise.  For each of the possible memberships of size N, the collateral required
of all members is the expected loss on failure of the weakest credit.  The
opportunity cost is the alternative return that members can earn by investing their
collateral elsewhere.  For purposes of the simulation, this is 5% scaled to a
contract value of 1000.
As suggested by the above discussion, adding members increases the
number of service channels and decreases expected wait time.  Using standard
queueing results
1, I calculate expected wait times for each possible membership
size.  Assuming wait time is mutually exclusive of other productive activity, the
cost of time in the queue accrues at 5% per period.  I normalize costs to the
servicing cost for one contract servicing period.  Thus, the all-in cost for one
contract is the 5% incurred during the servicing interval plus a charge for time
spent waiting.  If the time spent waiting is 10% of the time spent processing, then
the additional charge is ½% (= 5% x 1/10).
Table 1 gives the calculated cost schedules for collateral and
immediacy.  Collateral costs rise gradually from zero to 0.0367 per contract.  The
                                           
1 See Moser (2002).7
steepness arises from the sharp increases in average default losses as bond
ratings decline.  In contrast, adding new members drives immediacy costs to
zero very quickly.  For this illustration, combined costs—by construction these
are average costs—reach their minimum at five members.  Beyond five members
combined costs rise—the steep rise in collateral-holding costs dominating a less









2 0.0033 0.2963 0.2996
3 0.0038 0.0164 0.0202
4 0.0043 0.0032 0.0075
5 0.0050 0.0007 0.0057
6 0.0060 0.0002 0.0062
7 0.0075 0.0000 0.0075
8 0.0100 0.0000 0.0100
9 0.0150 0.0000 0.0150
10 0.0300 0.0000 0.0300
11 0.0360 0.0000 0.0360
12 0.0367 0.0000 0.0367
 
The next section moves away from this specific parameterization and
moves toward developing economic intuition for this perspective on a futures
exchange.
III. Specialization Within an Exchange Membership
Memberships do not specify the activities of individual members, but
members do specialize.  Though the term “market maker” connotes a single
market for all buy and sell activity, in reality “market makers” construe their
markets much more narrowly.  One market maker may be quoting a June-8
September spread market while another quotes a market for the September
contract only.
This role differentiation also applies to the activities required for servicing
orders arriving from nonmembers.  Brokers and Futures Commission Merchants
(FCMs) specialize in bringing buy and sell orders to the exchange, locals
specialize in supplying immediacy.   This section expands on this differentiation
and models the provision of immediacy services.
The Immediacy Provisioning Activity of “Locals”
Brokers focus on bringing order flow to market.  This activity precludes
time spent keeping track of extant buy and sell interests.  As a result, brokers are
not well equipped to immediately match a new buy or sell order to another broker
seeking to sell or buy.  Unlike brokers, locals do not bring order flow to market.
Locals fill the need for immediacy by keeping themselves aware of the current
buy or sell interests of the brokers.  This role separation constitutes a
specialization of skills.  Brokers specialize in developing and maintaining the
external associations needed to bring order flow onto the exchange and locals
specialize in matching buy and sell orders.
Locals accomplish their roles by transacting with brokers to take pieces of
broker-originated customer orders.  Upon its being parceled out to locals, broker
servicing of a customer order is complete.  Locals, in turn, then transact to
reverse their positions.  Those transactions ultimately match to customer orders
on the other side.  For example, broker A has been negotiating with a customer
for a large sell order.  In the interim, the buy-sell interests of other brokers could9
change, so that the task of locating buyers can delay order execution.  Locals
tracking the buy interests of floor brokers will buy portions of the order originated
by broker A then sell the position to brokers presently looking to fill orders for
their customers.
The specialization of the activities of locals and brokers requires revising
the representation of the exchange provided in the previous section.  Orders
awaiting service are those held by locals; that is, the waiting area of the queue
consists of the positions held by locals.  This implies a capacity limitation on the
number of orders queued at any instant.  The combined financial capacity of
locals to carry positions defines this limit with new orders being rejected on
reaching this limit.
The Cost of Adding Liquidity Providers
Loan spreads of the form r-rf compensate for expected loss plus an add-on
compensating for the risk that actual loss exceeds the expectations of risk-averse
lenders.  With an appropriate model, one can parse spread components to
extract the loss expectation.  The point of this subsection is to demonstrate how
member differences in expected losses affect their opportunity costs.  Thus,
assuming risk neutrality is sufficient for present purposes and expected loss is
represented as e
(r
0-rf) –1 where r0 is the rate for loans extended to member 0 and
rf is the default-free rate.  Save for their different default prospects, the loan terms
priced in the two rates are matched in all relevant respects and both are
continuously compounded.10
Observing the loan spreads available to potential members provides the
exchange with useful information on their creditworthiness.  Computing expected
losses as above and ranking these lowest to highest (see Figure 1) provides the
exchange with information relevant to its future collateral requirements.
Figure 1





0-rf).  This rule holds because adding the new member





member poses a risk increase that must be managed and the membership incur
costs associated with managerial effort.
2  Retaining the presumed risk neutrality,
margin collected from the new member covers the loss expected from its contract
nonperformance.  Comparing a prospective new member to member 0, the
                                           
2 Use of a potential member’s existing borrowing rate implies that exchange
access to information about a potential member is no better than that known by
the member’s lenders.  Neither does the exchange have a comparative
advantage in using the information it does have.11




0-rf).  When margin assessments
are member specific, then collecting margin sufficient to cover the expected loss
owing to that member’s nonperformance does not increase costs for existing
members.  It follows too that when members cover risk-management costs
introduced by their membership, prospects improve that existing members are
more likely to favor their admission.
However, exchanges do not differentiate their margin assessments.
Instead, margin requirements are uniform implying that a membership may
realize higher costs when admitting new members.
3  Member 0 calculates the
cost added by admitting an additional member from three items: the increase in
required margin, the rate of return that member 0 can earn on this amount, and
the number of contracts on which the added amount will apply.
4  In a one-
member-one-vote organization, members evaluate their benefit from adding new
members.  Decisions based solely on extra margin cost and immediacy
improvements will admit new members up to the point where at least N/2+1
voting members expect positive net benefits.
                                           
3 Though exchanges generally set uniform margins, clearing members can and
do assess higher margins for the accounts they clear.  This does obtain greater
differentiation than implied by exchange rules.  The conclusions of this paper go
through provided margin assessments are less than perfectly elastic with respect
to the nonperformance risks of individual members.  I am grateful to Pat
Parkinson for pointing out this institutional detail.
4 By reducing the number of open contracts, member 0 can reduce the cost
implied by the added amount and the rate of return available on that amount.
However, this entails a reduction in benefit that is otherwise obtained by carrying
those positions.12
The preceding characterization demonstrates a relationship between
nonperformance costs and the number of memberships.  Exchanges add brokers
to bring order flow to the exchange, they add locals to improve the immediacy of
order fills.  Order flow and immediacy are linked through the extent to which
immediacy permits brokers to engage in their specialties.  Because the value
added from order-flow origination is clear, the remainder of the paper focuses on
the immediacy implications of adding locals.
The Value Added by Liquidity Providers
Locals add value by absorbing short-term, order-flow imbalances.  A
broker bringing a large order to the floor best serves client interests when the
order is executed at an average price no less favorable than the market price
when the order was given.  Simultaneous arrival of identically sized and offsetting
orders—a buy for every sell—is unlikely.  More likely, the requisite order matches
are dispersed amongst several  brokers.  “Working the order” is time consuming;
that is, time spent locating selling brokers and negotiating prices detracts from
the broker’s efforts to bring additional order flow into the exchange.  Locals,
specializing in tracking existing buy and sell interests on the floor, take positions
expecting to trade out of them.
5  The latter trade can be with a selling broker or
another local.
6   Figure 2 provides a schematic detailing the order flow being
modeled.
                                           
5 Locals carry positions for very short intervals.  Silber (1984) calculates average
holding periods for a sample of locals.  He reports the average term of their
positions is less than two minutes.
6 Trades with other locals are more frequent.  Curran (2002) shows that during a
1997 sample period broker-to-broker transactions in the S&P 500 contract13
Figure 2
For simplicity, I assume that one or more locals immediately take up
orders introduced by brokers.  In practice, these transactions are less immediate.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests this time is generally much smaller than
the time spent by locals working their pieces of the order.  The assumption
                                                                                                                                 
represented 10% of contract volume.  All other transactions were broker-to-local
(65%), or local-to-local (25%).




with sell sides of
order.
Buy order arrives at broker desk
Broker brings order to exchange floor.
Sell order arrives at broker desk
Broker brings order to exchange floor
Locals take portions of order14
permits a simplification: I can represent order flow taken by locals as queued for
matches with later-arriving orders.
7
Initially, I also assume that locals take, at most, one contract.  In queueing
theory terms, this implies that a local represents one potential queue space.  The
assumption avoids two complications.  First, it enables the analysis to focus on
the marginal effect from adding queue spaces rather than the marginal effect of
adding locals with each taking more than one order.  Second, the assumption
sidesteps comparisons of contract-nonperformance prospects for locals taking
multiple contracts.
8  On establishing a tradeoff between immediacy and credit
risk, the succeeding section then considers how exchange rules can affect the
capacity of locals to carry more positions.
Moser (2002) provides performance measures for a queueing model
having c service channels and N-c queueing spaces.  The model has two
stochastic elements: customer inter-arrival time and servicing times, both
assumed to be Poisson distributed.  I denote expected inter-arrival times as λ
and expected service times denoted as µ .   With these parameters and assuming
a steady state, an expectation for queue length, denoted Lq, can be derived.  The
next three figures convey intuition for the effects from changing service channels
(broker) and number of queue space (locals).
                                           
7 Queueing theory does offer ways to deal with a series of queues.  I find no
gains in insight from adding this complexity.
8 For example, a local having weak credit carrying one contract can pose less
credit exposure than posed by a local having stronger credit but carrying 1,000
contracts.15
Figure 3 illustrates the effect on queue length from adding customers with
a fixed number of servicing channels.  Queue capacity is defined as the
maximum number of customers that can be in the system minus the number in
service channels.  The curve’s flatness near the origin occurs because expected
queue length is zero when the number of service channels exceeds the number
of customers.  Beyond that point, expected queue length rises as the number of
customers in the system rises.  For an exchange, the figure demonstrates that for
a fixed number of brokers (service channels), the need for locals to absorb
arriving orders increases as the number of customers increases.
Figure 3
Figure 4 illustrates the effect on queue size from increasing the number of
service channels for a fixed number of customers.  The initial effect on queue
size from increasing the number of service channels is, at first, relatively small.
As increasing the number of service channels improves the odds that arriving
customers are immediately processed, expected queue size declines more
rapidly.  As the probability increases that a service channel will be open, queue16
length declines less rapidly.  As before, a service channel is interpreted as a
broker.  Hence, increasing the number of its active brokers diminishes the need
for locals to carry positions.
Figure 4
The following differential equation combines the effects of increasing
queue capacity (dN, changes in the number of locals) and adding service
channels (dc, changes in the number of brokers):













Solving for dN/dc obtains the needed increase in locals for a change in the
number of brokers to obtain the same expected queue length.  I evaluated the
expression for various numbers of locals and brokers, finding that the number of
locals increases, at increasing rates, in the number of brokers.17
Cost-Minimizing Behavior
The previous two subsections identify quantities for two costly resources.
Managing credit risk entails pledging collateral against nonperformance.  The
cost of this resource is its use in other productive activities.  Time, in particular
time spent queued, is the second resource and its cost is the value of foregone
activities.   To equilibrate these resource costs, I re-state expected queue length






The intuition for the transformation is as follows.  In equilibrium expected
customer arrivals occur every λ  time units.  During that interval, those previously
residing in the queue expect to advance one space.  A counter example makes
the case for this result.  Were it not true, the system cannot be in equilibrium as
either expected queue length continues to increase or the system goes to zero.
Hence, the expected time cost is the value of lost opportunities during queued
intervals of length Wq.
At the margin, the expected rate of return from foregone opportunities
equals the expected rate of return from investment opportunities.
9  Were they not
equal, resources would be re-allocated until meeting the equality condition.
Hence, the expected wait-time cost for member 0 is e
r0Wq -1.  Naturally wait time
costs are increasing in Wq, the rate of increase is r0e
r0Wq >0.   As shown
previously, members can decrease queue length by increasing the number of
                                           
9 As before, risk neutrality is assumed.18
service channels.  It follows that increasing service channels obtains lower wait
time costs.
  However, scarcity of creditworthiness implies that adding members may
require relaxing credit standards and lead to higher costs via greater risk
management effort.  For simplicity, the exchange manages credit risk entirely
through collection of collateral deposits against contracts.  Note that this implies
that all members post identical collateral amounts.  Hence, adding members
increases costs for all members.  The amount of cost increase incurred when
member 0 takes on a new contract is:
) 1 )( (
0 0 − −
− − r r r r r e e e
f f i (3)
that is, the product of the added amount of collateral required from member 0
when member i is admitted and the opportunity cost paid by member 0 when
posting additional collateral.  This cost increases in ri at the rate e
ri-rf+r0 > 0.
Adding members requires comparing the effect of new members on wait-
time costs that decrease in membership size and on risk management costs that
increase in membership size.  The optimal decision for member 0 is when the net
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When an existing membership makes this decision each member evaluates their
net cost.  Proposed new members are admitted when the above condition is
satisfied for more than N/2 members.
Figure 5
   
Figure 5 illustrates the margins for these decisions by plotting the dN/dri
curves implied by equation 4.  The solid curve represents an exchange having
four members, three of which are brokers.  The dashed curve increases the
number of members to five, and the dotted curve increases that number to six.
The curves are positively sloped, demonstrating the value placed on improving
immediacy especially when the number of locals is small.  Existing exchange
members are willing to incur substantially higher collateral costs when adding













risk implies existing members realize improved immediacy with lower costs of
risk management.
As the number of existing members (N) increases (holding c, the number
of brokers, constant), adding members becomes less attractive.  For example,
despite the credit risk implied by a new member whose cost of funds is 20%,
members value the improvement in immediacy sufficiently to add nearly 3 locals
(solid line) when the number of existing members is 4.
10  However, with five
existing members (dashed line) less than 2 locals are added.  Finally, with six
members (dotted line) interest in adding locals declines further still.
          In conclusion, when immediacy services are scarce, exchange members
are willing to pay substantially higher risk management costs to obtain
improvements.  As the scarcity of this service declines, their willingness to bear
these costs also declines.
IV.  Exchange Rules Facilitating Entry of Liquidity Providers
The previous section illustrates how exchange memberships resolve
tensions between their immediacy needs and the effect that fulfilling those needs
has on risk management costs.  This section explores the separate interests of
brokers and locals to obtain greater insight into the members’ decision process.
A straightforward maximization of the expected profit argument establishes a
                                           
10 The model’s construction doesn’t permit consideration of partial memberships.
However, exchange rules permitting “dual trading” do accomplish this.  Although
subject to certain customer-protection rules, exchanges permit members to trade
as both a broker and a local.  The Chicago Mercantile Exchange generally
prohibits dual trading “in any contract month which is mature and liquid.”  (CME
Rule 552.B) This is to say that the CME permits dual trading where immediacy
services are most valued.21
relatively strong motivation for brokers to resolve immediacy problems.  The case
for locals seeking similar ends relies on concessions in the form of exchange
rules that favor their market-making activities by increasing revenues and limiting
their amounts of required cash capital.  These rules are consistent with exchange
pursuit of immediacy.  For example, the rules might be conjectured as
concessions offered by brokers to attract greater participation by locals.
Broker Interest in Immediacy
Earlier sections use a specialization argument to motivate the interests of
brokers for their pursuing immediacy.  Allocating their time between two mutually
exclusive activities—working with external customers and market making—
immediacy provided by locals permits brokers to work within their specialty.
Simple profit maximization strengthens this argument.  Recalling the finite
queue size developed in the previous section implies, on occasion, an
exhaustion of the capacity of locals to accept positions.  In these instances,
brokers must choose between refusing the orders of current customers or
accepting those orders and conducting their own market-making activities.  I will
assume that in expectations the cost of either is the same.  This is tantamount to
assuming the expected time to work an order precludes accepting the next order
as well as assuming equal value added from either activity.  Accepting the
second of these assumptions seems reasonable, the first is less reasonable for
several reasons.  First, brokers working their orders have stepped out of their
specialties.  It is unlikely that their efforts in a market-making capacity will be
equally profitable.  Second, a market that has used up its immediacy capacity is22
likely to be a fast market.  In these instances, time required to work the order is
likely to increase while time between order arrivals decreases.  Hence, the
assumed equality of costs for the brokers’ alternatives probably understates the
brokers’ interests for improved immediacy.
Recalling that N is defined as system capacity, let PN be the probability of
N customers being present; i.e., all service channels and queueing capacity are
in use.  Having no additional capacity, brokers must reject new orders until queue
space becomes available.  Queueing theory refers to this as “balking.”  In such
cases, broker profit is nil.  During less congested periods, brokers obtain profit
denoted π , these times occur with probability (1–PN).  Hence, expected broker
profits can be stated in queue-capacity terms as follows:
[] () EP P NN ππ =+ − 01
                        (5)
Increasing queue capacity clearly reduces the probability of balking and




> 0.  This establishes a motivation for brokers to
incur costs in their efforts to resolve immediacy problems.  Among these costs
can be exchange rules that improve immediacy, most especially rules that
improve immediacy during fast markets.
Capacity Limits for Locals
Define the local’s financial position as V defined in terms of the local’s
cash position C and the market value of her open positions, that is as follows:
L s FQ FQ C V − + = (6)23
Where F is the futures price and Q gives the number of open contracts, the
subscripts S and L denoting, respectively, short and long positions.  Price
changes are marked against the local’s position.  On obtaining sufficient cash to
support her positions, then the local’s goal is ∆ V=0.  Absent inventory
adjustments in response to price changes, then changes in the value of the
position are:
() s L L s Q Q F FQ FQ C − ∆ = ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ (7)




s L F C Q Q − = σ σ (8)
So the extent of price variability resulting from the local’s net position determines
the volatility of changes in cash holdings.  The next two subsections provide two
routes for affecting the local’s willingness to increase the supply of immediacy
services.
Tick Size as a Means of Compensating Locals
Exchanges define tick sizes as the minimum amount of nominal price
change.  Table 2 illustrates with examples for several well-known contracts.24
Table 2
Exchange Contract Tick Size Dollar Amount
Of Tick Size
Treasury Bonds 1/32 31.25 $ CBOT
Soy Beans 1/4 12.50 $
S&P 500 1/10 25.00 $ CME
Eurodollar 1/100 25.00 $
Crude Oil 1/100 10.00 $ NYMEX
Unleaded Gasoline 1/10000 4.20 $
NYBOT Orange Juice 1/100 7.50 $
COMEX Gold 1/10 10.00 $
EUREX Eurobund 1/10000 10 EU
The pricing units used by the underlying cash markets determine tick
sizes.  This convention, because it eliminates the need to restate futures prices,
facilitates futures trading by parties having on-going positions in the underlying
market.  The product of the pricing interval and the notional value of the futures
contract obtain the dollar values implied by each minimum tick size.  For
example, the S&P 500 pricing interval is 1/100 of an S&P point.  The notional
value of that contract is 250 times the S&P 500, the product (0.01 * 250) is $2.50.
The minimum tick size is 10 pricing intervals for a dollar value of $25.00.
Consider two possibilities: the contract trades at its pricing interval of 2.50
or at its minimum tick size of 25.00.  The bid-offer prices quoted by locals will be
multiples of 2.50 or 25.00.  At a 2.50 pricing increment, the bid-offer spread can
be bid down as low as 2.50.  At 25.00, the bid-offer spread can only be bid down
to 25.00.  In exchange parlance, both are “one-tick markets.”   The first implies
local compensation is $2.50 per trade, the second gives compensation of $25.00
per trade.  The effect of choices between these alternatives on the supply of
locals is straightforward.25
Tick-size contract specifications amount to a form of price-administration
having two effects.
11  First, recognize that perceived instances of market failure
are an important motivation for administering prices.  In the present instance, the
minimum tick size assures that the supply of immediacy-providing locals will be
higher than may result were the minimum lower.  In terms of the value of a local’s
position, price administration prevents the local from incurring a market-
determined bid-offer rate below 25.00.  Recalling the earlier point that exchanges
do not manage member specialties, the exchange must rely on incentives to
adopt needed specialties.  This floor on per-contract compensation improves the
revenues of locals provided contract volume is sufficiently inelastic to its
consequent bid-offer spread.
Second, noting that price variation accumulates over time, minimum price
increments increase the time a local has to reverse out of a position.  Referring to
the above example, define average deviations in equilibrium prices for one-
minute holding periods as 2.50.  A local can expect no less than 5 minutes to
offset a position before equilibrium price changes can be expected to round up
(or down) to the next allowable pricing increment of 25.00.  Were the minimum
price interval to be 2.50, the local has less than 1 minute to do so.
12  Locals
seeking to avoid exposure to price changes will prefer contract terms that offer
sufficient time to close out their positions
                                           
11 For an example, see the Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2001).  They study
changes in the terms of the CME’s S&P 500 contract.  Curran (2002) extends
their study.26
Price Limits as a Means of Reducing Costs of Carrying Cash Balances
Miller and Orr (1966,1968) derive optimal balances for zero-drift cash
accounts when cash holdings have an opportunity cost denoted v and
















     (10)
where σ c
2 is the variance in dollar terms of net inflows and outflow of cash.
Substituting for σ c
2 with the variance of futures prices (see equation 8) and taking
the derivative with respect to σ F




























The local’s net position is (QL – Qs), so from 11 we can conclude that the optimal
level of cash balances rises with the volatility of prices, with time, and with cash-
balance replenishment cost.  The optimal cash-balance level falls as the
opportunity cost for cash balances rises.
                                                                                                                                 
12 These examples presume tick-size conventions obscure equilibrium prices.
Thus, equilibrium prices fall within a range defined as ½ pricing increment above
or below an observed price.27
Figure 6 depicts the effect of futures price volatility on optimal cash
balances for a single contract over one holding period with a one-period
opportunity cost of 5% of the cash replenishment cost.  The relation's steepness
suggests that price volatility has an important role in determining the activities of
the local.  Holding constant revenue opportunities per dollar of available cash
balances, locals prefer low over high volatility positions.  It is appropriate to
understand this decision as a long-run choice.  For the short run, locals can
lessen their needs for cash balances by adjusting their net positions.
Similarly, Telser (1986) relates the short-run adjustment process to the
isomorphism between cash and futures contracts introduced.  Facing a short fall
in cash balances, the local chooses between an inventory adjustment and paying
γ  to replenish the cash account.  Thus, reducing instances requiring replenishing
of cash balances lessens the need for locals to adjust inventory.
Price limits establish ceilings on the cash amounts that can be required
within a single trading day.  To see this, consider a contract whose specifications
call for dropping the price limit on the day following a day in which the close price
Figure 6




































c(2t) where the arguments in
parentheses define the intervals for which variances are computed. 
13 As
demonstrated above, this reduction in cash flow variance reduces the level of
cash needed to support the position.  The effect is obtained by smoothing cash
flow needs across days.
Increasing the period over which a price shock can affect cash balances
benefits a local in two ways.  First, when the change results from an excessive
response to a price shock, a price reversal can be expected.  The local benefits
by a reduction in cash needed to restore the account.  Second, increasing the
amount of time available to replenish the account increases opportunities to
liquidate other holdings or to re-negotiate loan terms.  In both instances, as
developed in Moser (1986), the local has the equivalent of a zero-interest loan
from the winning side of the contract.  Reducing the effective rate for carrying
cash balances decreases the cost locals incur when they carry positions during
volatile markets.  Absent this cost reduction, locals might be expected to exit
when prices become volatile having the effect of reducing immediacy as volatility
rises.  Kuserk and Locke (1996) show that locals are more likely to carry
overnight positions when price limits are hit than when limits are not hit.  This
suggests the value of these implicit loans is sufficient to alter the behavior of
locals, they continue to supply immediacy despite the risk they will face overnight
exposure to price changes.
                                           
13 The inequality is weakened when the probability of a price change reaching the
limit is nil.29
V. Policy Implications and Conclusion
Economic models affect policy choices by altering the way that we
understand economic choices.  Knowledge that a tax distorts choices in
predictable ways gives the policy maker a sense of the cost and benefit implied
by changes in the tax.  It follows that improving the predictability of a response
improves the policy maker’s effectiveness.
This is particularly important for the regulatory style referred to as
“incentive compatible.”  This regulatory style rewards regulated firms for their
compliance with social goals.  As well-structured reward systems require full
understanding of organizational structure, models that parsimoniously convey
structural understanding are more conducive to effective regulatory policy.  The
key contribution of this paper comes through its illustration of linkage between
immediacy levels supplied by exchange membership and the creditworthiness of
their membership.  Incorporating this perspective into the policy formulation
process can improve its effectiveness at minimum by avoiding policy choices that
conflict with already-present incentives.
Policy Implications
The fundamental cause(s) of the Market Break of October 1987 will
probably never be understood, in part because the market mechanism itself
became part of the problem.
14  What comes through clearly is the dramatic
decline in the capacity of market makers during the Break.  At the Chicago
                                           
14 Gennotte and Leland (1991) demonstrate how market structure can affect
information flows in ways that exacerbate shocks to fundamentals.30
Mercantile Exchange, transactions involving locals averaged 46 percent of all
contracts during the three days prior to the Crash.  On October 19, this
percentage declined to 31.4 of contract volume and on the following day fell yet
again to 24.1 percent.
15  As CME market-making capacity declined, selling
shifted from the CME to the New York Stock Exchange overwhelming the NYSE
price reporting system.  The lack of timely price information added to uncertainty
and heightened selling pressure.
An extreme case yes, but the 1987 Crash illustrates linkage between
immediacy and creditworthiness.  On Black Monday, locals bought 48,487
contracts, selling all but 1,743 before market close.  As the price trend over the
day was sharply down, most locals ended the day with losses.  These losses
played an important role in decisions that substantially reduced participation of
locals later the same day and the day following.  This decline in immediacy at the
futures exchange moved selling pressure to New York.  Despite this connection,
credit extended for market making activities appears to have gone to NYSE
specialists.  This is not a criticism of the private credit decisions made during this
period, but there may be grounds for criticizing an apparent lack of concern for
the public’s interest.  It is fair to question whether credit extended to locals at the
futures exchanges might have more effectively served the public interest than the
same amount of credit provided to NYSE specialists.  Arguably concerns over
                                           
15 All of these are substantially less than reported in Curran (2002) in more recent
periods (see footnote 6) .  These and the following market statistics for October
1987 are drawn from the Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market
Mechanisms (Brady report) reprinted in Black Monday and the Future of31
the viability of the futures clearinghouses precluded this credit allocation.  If so,
solutions to these problems opens another avenue of response in some future
crash.  That is to say, a solution to clearinghouse viability problems that puts both
stock and futures markets on equal credit standing re-opens the question as to
where a credit allocation can best serve the public interest.
A second policy issue is the effect that electronic trading will have.  On its
face, the cost advantages of electronic trading are so great it is difficult to
imagine open outcry having much of a future.  However, the immediacy problems
noted by Miller (1996) remain unsolved.  This researcher believes that open
outcry will persist as long as electronic trading operates as a messaging system.
Message systems speed up order routing but improving order routing is not
sufficient for improving immediacy, orders must also be executed.
Electronic trading must also replicate the immediacy provided by locals in
open-outcry markets.  When operated as a messaging system every trader is a
potential immediacy provider, or not.  As is the case with a specialist, immediacy
providers face the prospect of trading at an information disadvantage.  To
succeed, the messaging system must convey information that can be utilized to
mitigate this disadvantage.  In open outcry markets, successful locals have
learned to extract information from market activity.  This information is not
conveyed by screen-based trading systems.  This constrains effective mitigation
of the information disadvantage.  Absent routes to avoid being disadvantaged,
                                                                                                                                 
Financial Markets, Mid America Institute for Public Policy Research, Chicago
Illinois 1989.32
prospective immediacy providers will require compensation proportional to the
level of risk.  At times, this cost may deter trading.
This is not to argue that electronic trading can’t succeed, these are
problems that can be overcome.  Open outcry markets developed solutions for
immediacy problems prior to their becoming subject to regulatory oversight.
Electronic exchanges must achieve similar innovations while satisfying their
regulators.  At least two problems arise from this need.  First, regulators stand to
be criticized when negative outcomes are realized, but are not rewarded when
outcomes are positive.  This payout structure explains the near universality of
risk aversion amongst regulators.  Second, innovations that threaten the viability
of existing competitors motivate attempts to influence regulators for purposes of
protecting the status quo.  Existing competitors can be expected to provide
detailed explanations as to how adoption of proposed innovations may cause
regulators to realize the negative outcomes they fear.
Forseeing these difficulties, in 1993 the Chicago Board of Trade proposed
a “Pro Markets” approach that segmented market participants by a combination
of financial sophistication and capacity to suffer losses.  This initiative, itself
unsuccessful, ultimately led to adoption of this regulatory philosophy in the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act in December 2000.  That Act enables the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to effect a multi-tiered regulatory
structure.  The Commission envisions exchanges operating as either designated
contract markets, as derivatives transaction execution facilities (DTFs), or as
multilateral transaction execution facilities (MTEFs).   The general public is33
eligible to participate in designated contract markets, consequently the
regulatory oversight of these exchanges is most restrictive.  Eligibility at DTFs is
limited to cash market participants, that is, traders making or taking delivery.
MTEF participation is limited to traders representing institutional firms.  Oversight
of the latter is minimal, limited to fraud and manipulation concerns.  At this point,
this regulatory framework appears to remove regulatory impediments that might
otherwise deter innovators from solving the immediacy problems noted by
Professor Miller.  The future of futures appears to one of interesting times.
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